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Since Victor Farias published his book detailing Heidegger's involvement in
National Socialism (1987), a wave of books have appeared which develop this
theme. One might expect that this trend of Heidegger criticism would produce
such dark revelations about his fascist tendencies as to dampen all enthusiasm
for his thought. Yet these works have had the reverse effect of stimulating new
interest in his philosophy, even to the point of spawning
"apologetics," if not
for his actions at least for his philosophical vision. Indeed, as this century
comes to a close, perhaps the greatest thinker of his time has never received
greater notoriety. Precisely for this reason the need for balanced criticism of
Heidegger's thought has never been more urgent. In this essay, I will develop
such an approach by examining a wide spectrum of books which seek to un-
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cover the truth about his fascist ties. In the process, I will point to a theme
which remains dormant throughout the majority of those analyses, namely, the
interconnection between Heidegger's concept of freedom and the example of
his politics.
We can appreciate a thinker's politics only by considering his or her corol
lary treatment of freedom, even when the scope of that freedom remains un
clear. When scholars analyze Heidegger's philosophy, however, they often
subordinate their explication of his concept of freedom to a conclusion already
drawn about his politics. In order to discern this tendency, we must examine the
different interpretive strategies which scholars employ to outline the place of
the polity in Heidegger's thought. Among the various books addressing Heideg
ger's Nazism and politics, we must first consider those which explore the ten
sion between his innovative development of ontology and his reactionary
political views. One such outstanding example, which follows on the heels of
Farias'
attempt to re-examine Heidegger's involvement in National Socialism,
is Michael Zimmerman's Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity. From this
spirit of an
"immanent"
criticism of Heidegger arises a more radical ex
amination of his presuppositions, which is exemplified in John Caputo's
Demythologizing Heidegger. Unlike Zimmerman, Caputo develops "decon-
structive"
strategies as practiced by the luminaries of postmodernity, including
Levinas, Lyotard, and Derrida, to expose Heidegger's thought to the criticisms
of those traditions which his brand of "Teutonic-Hellenism" excludes, e.g., Ju-
daeo-Christianity. As we will discover, Caputo's work forms an important
bridge between those scholars who sit on the Heideggerian fence and those who
reject his philosophy because of his politics.
Although Farias champions this position, a more recent example within the
English-speaking world comes from Tom Rockmore's Heidegger's Philosophy
and Nazism. Rockmore implements a method of criticism, which Hans Sluga
also exemplifies in Heidegger's Crisis, that may be described as "sociological-
historical." This fact-gathering enterprise is crucial in order to support the con
clusions, for example, that Heidegger embraced National Socialism and never
recanted its ideology, that he exhibited antisemitic tendencies, and that his
silence about the horrors of Auschwitz provides implicit evidence of his contin
ual allegiance to National Socialism. Given this historical archaeology, we can
evaluate different ways of making inferences from Heidegger the man-politician
to Heidegger the intellectual-thinker and vice versa. Not surprisingly, several
books paint the darkest implications of Heideggerian politics. Among these
books is Richard Wolin's The Politics ofBeing, along with the literature detail
ing the atrocities of the Holocaust, including Berel Lang's Heidegger's Silence.
Wherever the criticism of Heidegger becomes most severe, attempts to rein
terpret his thought in ways more compatible with our democratic vision become
inevitable. One such example, which implements an "analytic" method to refute
point by point the damning evidence his critics gather against him, is Julian
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Young's Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism. We must also include Leslie Paul
Thiele's Timely Meditations. This work stands apart by reinterpreting the key
motifs of Heidegger's thought in order to outline a politics which undercuts the
Nazi ideology he initially embraces.
II.
Even prior to Farias' book, most proponents of Heidegger's thought had
been aware of his brief flirtation with National Socialism when he became
rector of the University of Freiburg in 1933 and supported Hitler's rise to
power. Yet the overall "official story"has been to separate Heidegger the phi
losopher from Heidegger the politician, thereby creating a buffer between the
brilliance of his ontological insights and whatever myopia he may have shown
in his political judgment. The effect of Farias' revelations, however, was to tear
away this buffer and foreclose the all too convenient option of insulating
Heidegger's thought from the catastrophic historical events surrounding his life
in Germany. As poignant as Farias' revelations were, they would not have had
the impact they did upon many Anglo-American scholars if a transition were
not already under way to engage Heidegger's thought with an area of philoso
phy he seemingly ignored: namely, ethics. If the inquiry into being is to have its
root in the historical situation of human beings, then any such investigation
must speak to those ethical dilemmas which distinguish perhaps the most turbu
lent period in world history. As Zimmerman, Caputo, and Charles Scott began
to recognize in the 1980's, it is just as necessary to approach Heidegger's
thought as an occasion to question the possibility of ethics as to present his
philosophy as an esoteric narrative on the meaning of being. This shift in the
emphasis on Heidegger scholarship not only parallels
Farias'
work, but, indeed,
provides the climate for hearing the troubling allegations which he raises.
If concrete praxis orients the question of being, then practical concerns, e.g.,
of ethics and politics, must help to shape the landscape of ontological inquiry.
While this correlation may have been slow in capturing the interest of many
scholars, its importance had already been etched in Heidegger's thought with
the publication of his magnum opus, Being and Time (1927). In this work, he
emphasizes that a thinker can engage in ontological inquiry only by participat
ing in being's disclosure; hence, philosophy originates from the concrete situa
tion in which the inquirer places him- or herself in question and owns up to his
or her unique existence as a finite self. The thinker's commitment to authentic
existence fosters the openness of philosophical inquiry. Given this reciprocity
between thought and existence, it appears hypocritical to suggest that philoso
phy can secure a sanctuary for truth apart from its exemplification in the realm
of human action. As Herbert Marcuse argues in a famous letter to his teacher:
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'. . . we cannot make the distinction between the philosopher and the human being
Martin Heidegger it contradicts your own philosophy. A philosopher can be
mistaken about politics then he will openly admit his error. But he cannot be
mistaken about a regime that murdered millions of Jews merely because they were
Jews, that made terror part of everyday life and turned everything that ever was
really tied to the concept of spirit and freedom and truth into its bloody
opposite.'
(Quoted in Kettering and Neske, pp. xxiii-ix)
In Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity, Michael Zimmerman em
braces this statement as the leitmotif for his discussion. Thus the question he
asks is not simply whether Heidegger had Nazi ties, but instead how and why
his thinking became juxtaposed with such a destructive ideology. That is, what
were the set of variables which shaped Heidegger's interest in National Social
ism and seduced him into the misunderstanding that Nazi ideology could ex
press the political implications of his thought? To answer this question,
Zimmerman considers the interface between the intellectual Zeitgeist in Ger
many from Spengler's emphasis on the "decline of the
West"
to Jiinger's
concern for the worker's encounter with the global forces of industrialization
and Heidegger's interpretation of the crisis of Western history as a descent into
nihilism, the forgetting of being, and the end of metaphysics. The inquiry by
which he can address all of these issues simultaneously and distinguish their
unique configuration, of course, is "the question concerning
technology." As
the process of
"enframing,"
technology exerts control and domination over all
aspects of nature, granting humanity the power to impose its will on the diver
sity of being's manifestation.
One can debate the sociological factors which surround Heidegger's involve
ment in National Socialism, but the most basic consideration of all remains the
problem of technology. Because of its global destructive power, technology
solicits from us equally radical responses in social organization in order that we
can combat this potential for destruction. As Zimmerman emphasizes, Heideg
ger saw both Western capitalism and communism as instruments of technology,
and hence turned to National Socialism as the political movement which sum
mons human beings to face this epochal challenge. The audacity of the politi
cians'decision became the corollary to the philosopher's attempt at original
thinking. "Heidegger claimed that only authentic thinking and poetry could
save Germany in its hour of crisis. By 'thinking,' he did not mean rational
calculation, but instead the mode of comportment which opened one up to the
awesome and dreadful presencing of
things,"
including its darkness and horror
(p. 84). On the surface, the need to develop a new politics to face the crisis of
our day, let alone the turmoil of Germany in the 1930's, is not far fetched. Yet
Heidegger went astray by underestimating how political leaders could be sub
verted by the powers of technology which they seek to harness, i.e., spearhead
ing violence and mass destruction themselves. As Zimmerman states:
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Unfortunately, what the Nazis meant by the 'unrestrained' and 'dark' was not the
being of entities, but instead blood and instinct, frenzy and violence, domination of
humanity and nature. As reactionary modernists, the Nazis united instinct with
technology in a way which led to unparalleled devastation. (P. 84)
In the end, Heidegger may succumb to a kind of hubris in believing that the
flawed realm of politics could ever yield a leader with the kind of world-histori
cal vision to match technology's global reach. Yet it is one thing to accuse a
person of hubris and quite another to trace its origin. According to Zimmerman,
Heidegger's hero combines a nostalgia for the Greek origins with a grandiose
sense of
"destiny"
(Geschick) as reflected in Schelling's thought.
The self-mythifying Heidegger believed that he had been destined to proclaim the
saving vision of his hero, Holderlin, and that he himself was thus the world-
historical figure who would transform the fate of the West. Consider Heidegger's
[emphasis on] the
'destiny'
linking him with Holderlin. . . The grandson of the
man born in a manger in Holderlin's beloved Swabian countryside knew that he
was destined to change the course of history! (P. 132)
The heroic leader must exhibit the creative power to transform tradition, that
is, to seek in the strife of the present the possibility of transmitting one's heri
tage to future generations. Art becomes the vehicle for joining these apparently
incompatible elements of harmony and strife, conflict and resolution. The ar
tist's ex-centricity must be revered in contrast to the complacency of bourgeois
convention and the self-serving politics of the modem enlightenment. Sacrifice
rather than comfort provides the key to motivate individuals to place their trust
in a new political regime. But the question becomes whether the artist's way of
begetting creativity from chaos, harmony from strife, and destiny from destruc
tion can provide even the barest recipe for politics.
Once having understood why Heidegger found National Socialism to be at
tractive, we must still ask where these revelations leave us as scholars. Not
surprisingly, a rift emerges between the "right-wing
Heideggerians"
who uphold
his status as a thinker attuned to the voice of being and the "left-wing Heideg
gerians"
who employ deconstractive tactics to expose incongruities within the
Heideggerian text (Schurmann, p. 127). For those who still espouse Heideg
gerian themes, it becomes increasingly evident that the question of politics lies
at the forefront of any future appropriation of his philosophy. On the one hand,
Zimmerman pinpoints the dissonance between Heidegger's grasp of the West-
em crisis and the prospect of translating that insight into guidelines of political
action. On the other hand, a new opportunity arises to take Heidegger's short
fall as an occasion to re-examine the perennial problem of the relation between
theory and praxis, philosophy and politics. Going forward, the greatest chal
lenge is to recast Heidegger's thought through a dialogue which examines the
possibility of politics in the contemporary world.
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Within the past decade, there have been two major breakthroughs which
have dramatically changed the face of Heidegger studies. The first involves the
emergence of the political question and the revelations of Heidegger's involve
ment in National Socialism. The second pertains to the discovery of Heideg
ger's thought in the early 1920's; in his youthful "hermeneutics of
facticity," he
uncovers an ethos which includes motifs from primordial Christianity, e.g, love
and community, otherwise absent in his stark concept of Dasein. In De-
mythologizing Heidegger, John Caputo blends these two developments in a way
which plays the compassionate spirit of Heidegger's early religious orientation
against the callousness of his subsequent commitment to totalitarian politics.
Thus Caputo distinguishes the two major dislocations in Heidegger's thought
from which a new topography of questioning can emerge.
According to Caputo, Heidegger's turn to National Socialism parallels his
commitment to specific volitional categories of strength, self-affirmation, and
heroism, all of which stem from Hellenic thought. "His baffling silence about
the Holocaust, the scandalous comparison of the gas chambers to modem agri
culture . . . these are all scandalously insensitive to real
'factical'
pain and
concrete human suffering"(p. 73). The exclusivity with which Heidegger up
holds the Greco-German virtues amounts to dismissing the importance of an
other set of categories of Christian origin, the categories of tenderness, charity,
and love. Despite the religious orientation of Heidegger's early thought, "he
was deaf to the solicitousness about the flesh in the biblical narratives . . (p.
72).
The deconstruction of Heidegger's thought requires an alternative axis to
unfold the key motifs of his ontology, including care, truth, and temporality.
But an appropriation of Heidegger's thought cannot occur without undoing the
Greco-Germanic "myth" of a privileged origin from which Western philosophy
arises and the nostalgic search for it through a "homecoming" (Holderlin). In
advancing this criticism, Caputo concurs with Karl Lowith, who rebuked his
teacher for his "self-stylization into a shepherd, thinker, and sayer of
'being' "
(Lowith, p. 68). Only by purging Heideggerian thought of this tendency does it
become possible to cultivate another ethos whose roots spring from the Judaeo-
Christian heritage. Ironically, the German people's Christian heritage does not
seem to have been much of a deterrent in preventing the atrocities of National
Socialism. As Caputo indicates, Heidegger abandoned his early theological ori
entation in favor of Holderlin's mythic-poetic vision of the gods. To open
Heidegger's thought to the "piety" of other traditions, we must cultivate a plu
ralistic forum in which to express various criticisms of his philosophy: the need
to heed the voice of the disenfranchised (Levinas), the persecuted (Lyotard),
and the dissident (Derrida). According to Caputo, a new "justice" must emerge
which speaks to the suffering of the individual, to the radically
"singular," in
contrast to the generic "truth" of being's claim upon Dasein (p. 207).
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III.
Heidegger's most vehement critics converge in a single attempt to counter
the wholesale attempt by "Heideggerians" to whitewash their mentor's involve
ment in National Socialism. In Heidegger, Philosophy, and Nazism, Rockmore
exemplifies this critical stance, as does Sluga in Heidegger's Crisis. Both schol
ars proceed less as disciples steeped in Heidegger's texts and more as histo
rians; their strategy is to uncover unusual facts about Heidegger the person and
then weave them together in an ultimate detective story assessing his
"guilt"
and
"innocence." As Rockmore states, the time has come to combat the "offi
cial
story"
that Heidegger briefly flirted with National Socialism in 1933 only
to reject it shortly thereafter upon resigning from the post of rector in 1934, and
that, despite whatever personal shortcomings Heidegger may have exhibited as
a man, these have no bearing on our assessment of his thought. "What I call the
'official'
view is propagated not only by Heidegger but by some of his closest
students. It is the view that, roughly speaking, there is no, or no important, link
between Heidegger's philosophical position and National Socialism" (p. 74).
Rockmore's overarching thesis is that Heidegger's thought is "intrinsically
political"(p. 54). Rockmore thereby closes the loophole by which Heidegger's
defenders seek an escape from confronting his Nazism, namely, maintaining the
purity of his thought over against its contamination by his behavior from 1933
to his "Spiegel Interview" in 1966. Rockmore, however, construes the term
"political" in a narrower sense to mean the implementation of a kind of ideol
ogy aligned with Heidegger's thought, rather than a reflection upon the princi
ples of the polity. This distinction becomes important, for Rockmore maintains
that the key motifs of Heidegger's philosophy (e.g., the
"hero," "resoluteness,"
"conscience," "destiny") are adaptable to Nazism and only Nazism. Thus Rock
more makes a stronger claim than most in suggesting that Heidegger's "turn to
Nazism was based in his philosophy"(p. 54). This is a different position than
maintaining that Heidegger outlines the ontological presuppositions of the polis
and hence his thought can be interpreted as implicating various political
stances.
Because Rockmore couches the Heideggerian problem of this polis in this
way, he can then establish the complex synergies which supposedly hold be
tween fundamental ontology and National Socialism. Thus Rockmore makes
the relevant associations between Heidegger's emphasis on the elitism of au
thentic philosophy and his leadership as rector of the German university, the
self's exercise of resolve and his political decision of 1933, being's transmis
sion of its destiny to a chosen intellectual and the German people's emergence
as a vanguard of world history. Yet even given the plausibility of these connec
tions, the most compelling question which Rockmore poses is whether some
element in Heidegger's philosophy prohibited him from recognizing the atroci
ties perpetuated under the banner of National Socialism.
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According to Rockmore, Heidegger sanctified the role of silence as an ingre
dient of authentic existence to the point that when the time came he had a built-
in excuse for not speaking out against the forces of totalitarianism. But it may
be more accurate to suggest that Heidegger acknowledged political develop
ments only on a macro level proper to thought and not on the micro level of
conflicting power interests. The question then becomes, Why does this disso
nance occur? And one possible answer might be that Heidegger's concept of
destiny includes a "tragic
dimension" in the purest Greek sense of strife and
reconciliation, of illumination and blindness, of freedom and necessity. While
the macrocosmic events of the Western crisis can be interpreted along these
lines, the Holocaust may be of such a singular character that the depths of its
darkness, unlike the nihilism Nietzsche envisioned, cannot be fit into the cate
gories of Greek tragedy. Of course, there are different interpretations of the
degree to which Heidegger was or was not antisemitic. But it is safe to say that
he never saw the persecution of the Jews as a philosophical problem in its own
right.
In Heidegger's Silence, Berel Lang points to a double fault by which
Heidegger ignored the plight of the Jews during Hitler's uprising, and then, in
retrospect, again neglected the "Jewish
question"insofar as the Holocaust con
stitutes the most abominable act of human history (pp. 5-8). In agreeing with
Rockmore, Lang maintains that it is necessary to "see a connection in Heideg
ger between the domains of the political and the philosophical, the public and
the private, the professional and the
occasional"(p. 5). In this sense Lang's
thesis is not altogether novel. What stands out is his clear way of focusing the
question for which even Heidegger's detractors do not have a simple answer:
How can we continue to grant Heidegger such premier stature in the history of
philosophy when his indifference to the plight of humanity appears so obvious?
The irony is that "Heidegger attempts to break the very notion of the limits of
thinking . . but in ignoring the "Jewish question"continues to "settle for
limits to his thought" (pp. 100-101).
Yet Heidegger was not the only German intellectual to align with the dark
forces of Nazism. What was it about not only Heidegger, but the intellectual
life he shared with others, which made the politics of National Socialism attrac
tive and which allowed intolerance toward the Jews to develop on such a broad
scale? This is the question which Hans Sluga raises. In Heidegger's Crisis,
Sluga reconstructs the historical environment which precipitated the rise of Na
tional Socialism. He emphasizes less the intricacies of Heidegger's thought and
more the unique role which philosophy took in Germany as a catalyst of politi
cal action. While Zimmerman and Rockmore show that philosophy does not
develop in a political vacuum, Sluga illustrates how thought can transform the
fragmented tradition of the German Volk and its uncertain future into a vision of
a single destiny. Ironically, philosophy assumes such a leadership role as com
pensation for a floundering economic and political life characterizing Germany
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in the 1930's. Given this condition of social instability, the link between a
philosophy which proclaims a new destiny and the rhetoric of a totalitarian
politics becomes more than accidental. Indeed, the resurgence of philosophy
prefigures the brand of Nazi politics to which the Germans ultimately suc
cumbed.
While Heidegger may have embraced Nazi ideology, he nevertheless upheld
a Greek view of politics as involving the determination of the polis as a
"site"
(topos). According to Sluga, this sense of the polis formed one important ingre
dient in an overall Gestalt of politics which took shape in National Socialism.
In a setting where institutions are on the decline, a voluntaristic sense of action,
an opportunism forged through the will, inevitably prevails. The action must be
"timely," but in order not to appear arbitrary it must project as a "common
descent"
among all of its proponents (p. 19). And because the determination of
this ancestry involves both establishing a hierarchy among its members as well
as excluding those who do not belong, a process of self-legitimation necessarily
occurs. "Politics is thereby always a process of self-legitimation in which par
ticular priorities for action and particular social structures must be justified" (p.
22).
In outlining this Gestalt of the political, Sluga takes an important step in
addressing to what extent a thinker's thought arises through a dialogue with the
political crises of his or her time. Philosophy cannot then be
"reduced"
to the
political, but rather a philosopher may inculcate within his or her enterprise a
questioning attitude which speaks to the possibility of politics (pp. 245-48). We
need to make this distinction in order to show that a philosopher harbors in
sights into the nature of the polis which may not be translated into any specific
political beliefs he or she upholds. For example, Heidegger understood the
Greek polis as a site that combines the human concern for the good with an
occasion to act, which unfolds within the historical compass of being's mani
festation. And while one may try to extract totalitarian elements from Heideg
ger's vision, it may be possible to develop other inferences about the polity
which conflict with the specific ideology of fascism. To preserve the question of
politics proves to be one of the greatest strengths of Sluga's careful analysis.
IV.
There are many different philosophers to whom we might turn to provide
insight into the nature of the polis Plato and Hegel, Mill and Kant, Arendt
and Marcuse. But despite Heidegger's Nazi ties, it is not obvious that he quali
fies as one of these
"political" thinkers. Because fascism is so contrary to the
tenets of Western democracy, it is not especially provocative to claim that his
ontology uncovers some of the basic components integral to any polis: e.g.,
freedom, community, and the possibility of law, for most critics construe these
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motifs as formal concepts whose meaning can only be derived from the circum
stances in which Heidegger first articulated them, his commitment to National
Socialism.
Richard Wolin is one such critic we must address before entertaining the
hyperbolic prospect of a "Heideggerian
politics."In The Politics of Being,
Wolin paints a grim picture of what happens when a philosopher breaks with
the enlightenment tradition of political checks and balances and seeks to recre
ate the polis ex nihilo from a single
"decision" (Entscheidung). The abruptness
of Heidegger's political decision of 1933 has its analogue in his concept of
resoluteness (Entschlossenheit). While this correlation is among the most ob
vious, it is perhaps the most problematic. For Heidegger, resolve is a way of
bringing oneself in concert with what the situation demands, in order that one
can develop those possibilities which speak to the dilemma in question. Ac
cording to Wolin, however, resolve is of such a singular character as to render
indeterminate any prescription of the good within that decision (pp. 35 ff.). The
indeterminacy of Heidegger's concept of authentic selfhood implies that one
could exhibit the steadfastness of resolve and yet do terrible things, e.g., sup
port the inhumane ideology of National Socialism. Thus Wolin emphasizes the
lack of ethical content in Heidegger's concept of resolve.
Wolin pinpoints a problem which anyone sympathetic to the prospect of
developing a Heideggerian politics must confront. Heidegger believed that on
tological concepts must be developed out of the ontic stream of concrete, factic
experience. But once having developed concepts on an ontological plane, how
can their scope be readjusted to include the diverse variables of ontic concern
so that action becomes a locus of truth and the language of thought provides a
sanctuary of freedom? In Heidegger on Being and Acting, Reiner Schurmann
addresses this problem by suggesting that praxis constitutes the domain for
explicating the insights of Heidegger's thought; hence only praxis can illustrate
the mode of governance which thought seeks in divesting itself of all rational
principles (arche) and models of presence. An "anarchic
praxis"
unfolds at the
forefront of a new epochal relation between being and thought, in such a way
that thinking must be informed by action and not simply the other way around.
In many respects, Schurmann stands alone as a scholar who tackles a tenacious
problem and offers steps toward a solution. Anarchic praxis "will be di
ametrically opposed to the Fiihrerprinzip; it would be a type of action irrecon
cilably alien to all reduction to the uniform, action hostile to the
standard"(p.
14). Yet his solution operates on a plane of generality, it holds only if we accept
the deconstructive paradox that governance arises from overturning pre-existing
models of political rule.
We must recall that Schurmann published his book in French five years
before the publication of Farias' book; and while the former addresses the dan
gers involved in totalitarianism, he makes neither an encounter with Heideg
ger's Nazism nor an apologetic for it primary. As our discussion of the previous
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books indicates, the ensuing decade would produce more caustic criticisms of
Heidegger's Nazi allegiances than attempts at defending a political philosophy
based on his thought. Because in academics every movement pushes to its
extreme, it is not surprising that the pendulum would swing in the other direc
tion and a defense of Heidegger would emerge. In Heidegger, Philosophy, and
Nazism Julian Young counters the criticisms of the scholars mentioned above,
as well as those of a wide spectrum of European thinkers from Levinas to
Lyotard, Lacoue-Labarthe to Derrida.
Young proceeds like an
"analytic"
philosopher to provide a point by point
refutation of Heidegger's opponents. Against Rockmore and Wolin, Young
claims that Heidegger's turn to National Socialism was far from a sudden and
momentous decision; instead, Heidegger adopted a reactionary form of politics
which had been percolating in Germany for almost two decades (p. 50). Against
Hugo Ott, Farias, Rockmore, and Wolin, Young maintains that Heidegger was
not antisemitic but rather exhibited concern toward many of his Jewish students
(pp. 38-41). Moreover, Heidegger was skeptical of any attempt to apply bio
logical categories such as "blood-line" to designate a people as
"superior"
or
"inferior" (p. 41).
In a way which is couched more in the language of logic than phenomenol
ogy, Young claims that Heidegger's critics commit a fallacy in inferring a con
nection between his thought and Nazism. The fallacy works itself out on two
fronts as the claim that either Heidegger's philosophy harbors concepts which
"positively
implicate" National Socialism or his thought "negatively implicates
Nazism by failing to provide grounds for its
rejection"(p. 79). On the first
front, Young appeals to Heidegger's concept of authentic selfhood as promoting
a sense of responsibility which is contrary to the demand toward conformity
epitomized in totalitarianism. On the second front, Young argues that Heideg
ger's concept of solicitude promotes a concern for the other, for his or her own
integrity, in a way which condemns the exploitation of people under a fascist
regime. Young concludes that Being and Time harbors an ethic of respect for
persons in a way missed by Heidegger's
" 'decisionist' critics"(p. 104).
Young makes a case against Heidegger's critics which, if it does not answer
all of their objections, at least exposes some of their one-sidedness. Along with
Young, Fred Dallmayr crystallizes a perspective that there is "another Heideg
ger"beyond the Nazi ideologue. According to Dallmayr, Heidegger's example
of injustice provides an ironic way of re-examining his texts to discover in
sights into the nature of justice. By drawing upon Heidegger's eclectic interests
in Anaximander and Schelling, Dallmayr suggests that justice can be under
stood anew as a
"juncture" (Fuge) or measure which disposes us "to let others
be and to attend to them with considerate
care"(p. 125). When joined with
Young's emphasis on solicitude, Dallmayr's appeal to "letting
be" holds great
promise as a key for developing our political obligations toward others. But in
either case a further exploration of the parameters of human freedom may be
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required in order to rectify the omission which Lang identifies, namely, that
Heideggerian Gelassenheit lacks moral emphasis on "tolerance" (pp. 48-49).
As much as Heidegger's texts can be directed against him, they can also
yield nuances to enhance our reflections on the polis. Yet the fact that Heideg
ger's thought can take this novel turn may not be sufficient evidence in its own
right to
"vindicate" him either for his Nazi allegiance or subsequent silence
about it. A still more unorthodox approach must be taken which can transpose
Heideggerian motifs within a political context presumably alien to them, e.g.,
Western democracy, in order to articulate the democratic precepts we uphold.
Such an approach harbors a concession which most of Heidegger's critics have
refrained from making, namely, that democracy includes its own presupposi
tions which, if fully articulated, may exhibit shortcomings in our system of
government as we know it. Of all the scholars who appropriate Heidegger's
insights into politics in a positive way, Leslie Paul Thiele follows this lead.
In Timely Meditations, Thiele raises the question which would reorient phi
losophy within a practical context, although in a way which can speak to the
assumptions of contemporary democracy. If our democratic system is naive
about its assumptions, then an ontology must be able to cast light on the opera
tional concepts implemented in our democratic practices. Thus, as Thiele indi
cates, Heidegger develops an original understanding of freedom as "letting
be."
Correlatively, this "disclosive freedom" may evoke other facets of the liberties
we assume, including resetting the parameters of free speech which we accept
as a constitutional
"right" (pp. 81-83). As Thiele emphasizes, the key to devel
oping a democracy lies in safeguarding maximum participation among its mem
bers. In this way a community develops. What Heidegger recognizes, however,
is that the power which permits political participation, namely, language, simul
taneously allows for the cultivation of individuality with a communal setting,
that is, the self's unique way of dwelling with others. Language is not simply
an instrument of verbal expression, but calls each of us to submit to it as a
place of dwelling. In the proximity of this place we receive the guidance to act
as members of a community and thereby engage in dialogue over the most
equitable mode of governing. As Arendt suggests, the
"word" first inserts us
into the space of action in a way which gathers together each of us (as
speakers) within the nexus of community (The Human Condition, p. 198).
By tracing the synergy between logos and community, language and dwell
ing, Thiele develops a "postmodern politics." Yet this perspective remains
rather abstract unless it can develop a critical edge to match liberal thinkers'
criticism of Heidegger's political views. Thiele locates this critical fulcrum in
the way that language exhibits the disclosive power of truth, which for Heideg
ger is synonymous with freedom. In other words, there is a more primordial
connection between freedom and speech than appears in how the adjective
"free"
qualifies the activity of
"speech" in a democratic sense. Free speech is
not a
"right"
by which one individual asserts his or her self-interest over against
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another person, but rather is the "openness" through which contrary voices can
participate in serving the good of the community as a whole. "The justly hal
lowed right to free speech might be grounded not only in the speaker's preroga
tive to utter opinions and beliefs, but also on the listener's duty to remain open
to, even solicitous of, the ontological difference these opinions and beliefs may
harbor" (p. 128). While freedom as "letting be" can admit discord among its
participants, it cannot allow speech to become a self-indulgent expression of
will which is rooted in concealment rather than unconcealment.
Through his clever extrapolations, Thiele shows how democracy can be
predicated upon the spirit of dwelling in Heidegger's sense. "Democracy is a
journey toward freedom that remains ever under way. . . . Disclosive freedom
beckons to the democratic challenge"(p. 167). Thiele's attempt to link Heideg
ger's thought with democracy as Charles Sherover does with the help of a
Kantian framework merits serious consideration (Sherover, pp. 5-12, 60-63).
Yet, in recalling Sluga's criticisms, there is a subtle enigma which remains
unclarified about the interface between philosophy and politics. While Heideg
ger construes philosophy as the vanguard of politics, the situation is almost the
reverse in a democratic setting: the polis sanctions the philosophical enterprise
as an enterprise of free exchange. Is there a motif in Heidegger's thought which
could provide the linchpin for such a reversal, and thereby suggest that his
philosophy may
"implicate"
the opposite political stance which his own fascist
ideology condemns?
In his 1930 lectures on human freedom, Heidegger argues that his exchange
with previous philosophers must take the form of Auseinandersetzung (Vom
Wesen, p. 292). Literally, Auseinandersetzung means to "set
apart"
or "place in
opposition."
According to Heidegger, philosophical exchange thrives on such
controversy to the extent that the invitation of conflict reveals what is at stake
in freedom of speech: namely, inviting a contrary response from the other. The
welcoming of contrariness is not arbitrary, but like philosophical dialogue
serves a greater master, the process of unconcealment itself. As Heidegger
states in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology, philosophical inquiry is a
"work of human freedom" (p. 16). But freedom takes shapes within a forum of
exchange which safeguards the voice of the other. While philosophical inquiry
depends upon Auseinandersetzung, the voice of the other can resound only
because there is a forum reserved for it within the polis. Thus Heidegger's
philosophy comes in conflict with itself at the point where its commitment to
free speech yields to an ideology supporting censorship. (For a discussion of
how prominent censorship was in Nazi Germany and its connection with the
persecution of the Jews, see Sluga, pp. 86-100.)
Since by its nature the philosophical enterprise is iconoclastic, controversial,
and even subversive, it thrives within a polis where freedom of speech assumes
the greatest importance. Although in his rectoral address Heidegger discounts
"academic
freedom"
as weak spirited, philosophy can flourish only when it is
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reawakened to the challenge of freedom. Ironically, philosophy responds to this
challenge not by accepting the elitism of its task, but, on the contrary, by re
locating itself within the polis and the tradition as a whole, in which the fac-
ticity of each citizen is rooted. As Heidegger's words so eloquently suggest,
philosophy can then flourish through the "tradition [which] is a delivering into
the freedom of discussion (die Freiheit des Gesprdches) with what has
been"
(What Is Philosophy?, pp. 33, 35).
In this spirit, a Heideggerian politics would then become possible at the time
when such freedom could be translated into a "multivocality" which facilitates
dialogue among diverse traditions. Perhaps this time will arrive sooner than we
think.
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